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MOVING BEYOND CONSENT FOR CITIZEN
SCIENCE IN BIG DATA HEALTH AND
MEDICAL RESEARCH
Anne S.Y. Cheung*
ABSTRACT—Consent has been the cornerstone of the personal data
privacy regime. This notion is premised on the liberal tenets of individual
autonomy, freedom of choice, and rationality. The above concern is
particularly pertinent to citizen science in health and medical research, in
which the nature of research is often data intensive with serious implications
for individual privacy and other interests. Although there is no standard
definition for citizen science, it includes generally the gathering and
volunteering of data by non-professionals, the participation of non-experts
in analysis and scientific experimentation, and public input into research and
projects. Consent from citizen scientists determines the responsibility and
accountability of data users. Yet with the advancement of data mining and
big data technologies, risks and harm of subsequent data use may not be
known at the time of data collection. Progress of research often extends
beyond the existing data. In other words, consent becomes problematic in
citizen science in the big data era. The notion that one can fully specify the
terms of participation through notice and consent has become a fallacy.
Is consent still valid? Should it still be one of the critical criteria in
citizen science health and medical research which is collaborative and
contributory by nature? With a focus on the issue of consent and privacy
protection, this study analyzes not only the traditional informed consent
model but also the alternative models. Facing the challenges that big data
and citizen science pose to personal data protection and privacy, this article
explores the legal, social, and ethical concerns behind the concept of consent.
It argues that we need to move beyond the consent paradigm and take into
account the much broader context of harm and risk assessment, focusing on
the values behind consent – autonomy, fairness and propriety in the name of
research.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Consent has been the cornerstone of the personal data privacy regime.1
It authorizes the collection, use, and processing of personal data. When it
comes to health and medical research, consent is a prerequisite for the
intervention in one’s body, the collection of bio-specimens, and the use of
personal data.2 The doctrine of consent is premised on the liberal tenets of
individual autonomy, dignity, and integrity, rooted in the fundamental
respect to a person, and intertwined with the right to respect for privacy.3
More importantly, consent is only meaningful if it is freely given (voluntary),
specific, and informed.4
The above concern is particularly pertinent to citizen science in health
and medical research, in which the nature of research is often data-intensive
and has serious implications for an individual’s privacy and other interests.5
Although there is no standard definition for citizen science, the European
Commission has highlighted its general features to be the gathering and
volunteering of data by nonprofessionals and the participation of nonexperts
in analysis and scientific experimentation, with public input into research
and projects.6 Citizens become experimenters, stakeholders, purveyors of
data, research participants, or even partners in the process.7 Consent from
citizen scientists is indispensable as it is a constitutive element for
participants’ self-determination and self-empowerment. Furthermore,
consent from participants as data subjects determines the responsibility and
*

Anne S.Y. Cheung, Professor of Law, the University of Hong Kong. An earlier version of this article
was presented at the “Disciplining or Empowering the Citizenry Through Citizen Science” Conference,
organized by the Institutum Iurisprudentiae Academia Sinica, Taiwan in December 2016. The author
benefits from the valuable comments and suggestions of the participants. The author is grateful for the
research assistance of Jason C.P. So and Michael M.K. Cheung.
1 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U9BZ-KHSB].
2 MARCUS DÜWELL, BIOETHICS: METHODS, THEORIES, DOMAINS 193 (2013).
3 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 107 (7th ed.,
2012).
4 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of Consent, WP187,
at
34–35
(July
13,
2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2011/wp187_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/EJE8-9YGF].
5 Opinion No. 29 of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the Europeon
Comission: The Ethical Implications of New Health Technologies and Citizen Participation, at 20 (Oct.
13, 2015) [hereinafter Opinion No. 29 of the EGE], http://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/opinion29_ege.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VDE-J5MY].
6 Id. at 23.
7 Id. By citizens as “experimenters,” this refers to patients participating in various degrees in
experimentation. Id. at 25. “Stakeholders” refers to patient expert groups. Id. “Purveyors of data” refers
to citizens or patients sending data through digital devices, mobile devices, and other information
communication technology. Id.
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accountability of data users. Under orthodox understanding, consent should
be given on a one-on-one basis, for a “single study at a single institution for
a specific purpose.”8
While this may sound sensible and reasonable, technology always
produces new directions and challenges for research. With advances in
information technology and data analytics, health and medical research have
become data-intensive, global, and virtual.9 Biobanks and virtual research
repositories are gaining prominence and significance.10 At the same time, the
risk inherent in health and medical research and big data technology has
often extended beyond the existing data. In addition, the use and transfer of
data for other unforeseen purposes is often outside the control of the original
research team. Plus, the risks and harm of subsequent data use may not be
known at the time of data collection. Hence, consent becomes problematic
because the traditional understanding of consent, that one can fully specify
the terms of agreement in advance, becomes questionable in big data science
and citizen science.
We cannot help but ask: is consent still valid? Should it still be one of
the critical criteria in citizen science health research which is collaborative
and contributory by nature? While the big data challenge is not unique to
citizen science, the inherent sensitivity of health and medical data
exacerbates the problem, which calls for close scrutiny of the doctrine of
consent. With a focus on citizen science in health and medical research, this
study examines the doctrine of consent and its inadequacies. It then analyzes
the alternative and adaptive models of consent: open, broad, dynamic,
portable, and meta consent.11 Facing the challenges that big data and citizen
science pose to personal data protection and privacy, this article explores the
legal, social, and ethical concerns behind consent. It argues that navigating
one’s way through different models of consent and the varied choices in
consent forms can be a legal minefield. We need to move beyond the consent
paradigm into a broader framework of accountability, taking into
consideration harm and risk assessment. Ultimately, what lies behind
consent are the entailing values of autonomy, fairness, and propriety in the
name of research.
8

Bridget M. Kuehn, Groups Experiment with Digital Tools for Patient Consent, 310 JAMA 678,
679 (2013).
9 BETTINA SCHMIETOW, Ethical Dimensions of Dynamic Consent in Data-Intense Biomedical
Research—Paradigm Shift, or Red Herring?, in ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH,
RESEARCH ETHICS FORUM 197 (Daniel Strech & Marcel Mertz eds., 2016).
10 See generally Charles Auffray et al., Making Sense of Big Data in Health Research: Towards an
EU Action Plan, 8 GENOME MED. (2016), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4919856/
[http://perma.cc/V45C-7EJ2].
11 See infra Part IV.
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II. CITIZEN SCIENCE AND BIG DATA HEALTH RESEARCH
We begin our discussion by looking at the nature of citizen science. In
the mid-1990s, Alan Irwin popularized and prompted the discussion on
citizen science.12 Irwin examined the relationship between citizens and
science, including science that assists citizens’ needs and concerns and
science developed and enacted by citizens themselves.13 Irwin flagged up the
need to face up to the challenges posed by risks in scientific research and
sustainable development.14
By the 21st century, citizen science has developed into different forms
of participation by nonprofessional scientists, exhibiting various dimensions
in the cooperation between professionals and nonprofessionals and opening
up multiple levels of engagement in the health sector. At one end of the
spectrum, there are citizen-led, patient-owned initiatives of sharing
quantitative information, exchanging experiences on treatment, and
searching for the right clinical trials on online platforms. Prominent
examples include PatientsLikeMe,15 CureLauncher16 and CureTogether.17 At
the other end of the spectrum, there is commercial or government-led
research. For instance, Sage Bionetworks took advantage of smartphonebased health technology to study the lifestyle of 17,000 Parkinson’s disease
patients.18 It also paired up with Apple ResearchKit in 2015 to study the
quality of life of breast cancer survivors.19 In the same year, President Obama
announced the nationwide $215 million Precision Medicine Initiative to
build a large-scale research enterprise between public and private sectors,
calling for one million volunteers to contribute their health data so as to
extend precision medicine to all diseases.20 In between the two models, there

12

Barbara Prainsack, Understanding Participation: The “Citizen Science” of Genetics, in GENETICS

AS SOCIAL PRACTICE: TRANSDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON SCIENCE AND CULTURE 147 (Barbara Prainsack et

al. eds., 2014).
13 ALAN IRWIN, CITIZEN SCIENCE: A STUDY OF PEOPLE, EXPERTISE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT xi (1995).
14 Id. at x. Irwin’s case study was mainly on environmental development. Id. at xii.
15 PATIENTSLIKEME, https://www.patientslikeme.com (last visited May 9, 2018).
16 CURELAUNCHER,
http://curelauncher.com
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180103112551/
http://www.curelauncher.com/] (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
17 CURETOGETHER, http://curetogether.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
18 Max Little, Crowdsourced Parkinson’s Research: Engaging People, Opening Up Science, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-networkblog/2014/apr/07/parkinsons-disease-research-science-health.
19 Aditi Pai, Apple’s ResearchKit Now Available to Medical Researchers, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Apr.
14,
2015),
http://www.mobihealthnews.com/42370/apples-researchkit-now-available-to-medicalresearchers.
20 The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision
Medicine
Initiative
(Jan.
30,
2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
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is a third catering to joint collaboration between citizens and health
professionals in creating knowledge. A prominent example includes the
Sarroch Bioteca Foundation founded in 2012 in pursuit of a “citizen
veillance on health” project in Italy.21 The project was launched by the
Sarroch municipality in 2006 to gather biological samples donated by
citizens to monitor genetic changes as health indicators in relation to the
environment.22 All citizens of the municipality could become members of the
project.23 The aim was to use science to inform both health regulations and
institutional implementation policy.24 The Sarroch example can be seen as a
joint effort for collective governance and a model for democratic health
choice.25
Regardless of the level of citizen involvement, participation issues
related to the data privacy and security of research subjects (or the form of
cooperation in the above models as contractual, contributory, collaborative,
co-creative, or collegial26) will be triggered whenever citizens have
contributed their data or bio-specimens to the projects. Following the new
wave of citizen science research in big data is a whole new set of legal and
ethical concerns. First, we are witnessing an unprecedented scale of online
crowdsourcing, with researchers pooling data together using big data capture
strategies and data analytics.27 As the progression of research often extends
beyond the existing data, big data technology use and the transfer of data for
other unforeseen purposes is often outside the control of the original research

office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative [https://perma.cc/TSG8D7NA].
21 Mariachiara Tallacchini, Philip Boucher & Susana Nascimento, European Comm’n, Joint Res.
Center Sci. and Policy Reports, Emerging ICT for Citizens’ Veillance, at 30, EUR 26809 EN (2014),
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC90334/civ%20-%20final%20draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2UD-VAWH].
22 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 28.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Jennifer L. Shirk et al., Public Participation in Scientific Research: A Framework for Deliberate
Design, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC. 29 (2012), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss2/art29/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2018). The typology of the five project models is formulated by Shirk and her colleagues.
Contractual projects refer to communities asking professional researchers to conduct a specific
investigation and report. Id. Contributory projects refer to those designed by scientists, with citizens
contributing data. Id. Collaborative projects are similar to contributory project except with citizens
helping to refine project design, analyze data, or disseminate findings. Id. Co-created projects are jointly
designed by scientists and citizens, in which some citizens are actively involved in most or all aspects of
the research process. Id. Lastly, collegial contributions refer to non-credential individuals conducting
research independently with varying degrees of expected recognition by professional scientists. Id.
27 Mark A. Rothstein, John T. Wilbanks & Kyle B. Brothers, Citizen Science on Your Smartphone:
An ELSI Research Agenda, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 897, 897 (2015).
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team.28 Second, despite the promise of data de-identification, third parties
can match data sets to reidentify individuals.29 Third, with the advancement
of data mining and big data technologies, the risks and harm associated with
subsequent data use may not be known at the time of data collection and use.
For instance, large-scale harvesting of health data can reveal unnoticed
correlations between lifestyle and medical conditions of individuals. These
correlations are important information for insurance companies.30 The fear is
that insurance companies may use big data analytics to draw conclusions on
consumers’ health care use and thus increase premiums in unprecedented
ways.31 In other words, consent becomes problematic in health and medical
research, especially in the big data era. The notion that one can fully disclose
and specify the terms of notice and consent at the outset has become illusory.
III. RETHINKING CONSENT
Consent has been a cardinal doctrine in clinical treatment and research.
It is premised on the respect for individual autonomy, which embodies the
principle of self-rule that is free from “controlling interference by others and
limitations that prevent meaningful choice.” 32 It is enshrined in numerous
international treaties, legal guidelines, and codes.33 Namely, on the
protection of human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) stipulates that “free consent” is a prerequisite for medical
and scientific experimentation.34 On personal data, the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) state that “explicit consent” is
28 See Bartha Maria Knoppers & Adrian Mark Thorogood, Ethics and Big Data in Health, 4
CURRENT OPINION IN SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 53, 54 (2017); UNESCO, Report of the IBC on Big Data and
Health, at 11–12 (2017), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002487/248724E.pdf.
29 Lataya Sweeney, Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain Confidentiality, 25(2&3)
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 98, 98 (1997).
30 Aaron Stanley, Tech Companies See Market Opportunity in Healthcare Innovation, FINANCIAL
TIMES (May 5, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/709aa784-efd4-11e4-ab73-00144feab7de.
31 With big data analytics, insurance companies can collect large amounts of personalized data about
individuals for evaluating individual habits and lifestyles to create new predictive and risk models. Cathy
O’Neil, Big Data Is Coming to Take Your Health Insurance, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-04/big-data-is-coming-to-take-your-healthinsurance. Different jurisdictions have laws that prohibit the use of genetic data in health insurance.
Knoppers & Thorogood, supra note 28, at 53–54.
32 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 101.
33
For an historical overview, see Benjamin M. Meier, International Protection of Persons
Undergoing Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L.
L. 513 514–33 (2002). For further comparison of global guidelines on consent and informed consent, see
Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, Beyond Informed Consent, 82 BULL. WHO 771, 771–77 (2004).
34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”).
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necessary for the processing of genetic, biometric, and health data.35 Under
article 4 of the GDPR, consent means “any freely given, specific, informed
and unambiguous indication of the data subject” by a clear affirmative action
signifying agreement to the processing of personal data. On experiments
done by physicians, the Nuremberg Code sets the standards to which
physicians must conform when carrying out experiments on human subjects,
including obtaining consent and ascertaining competence from human
subjects in experiments.36 On medical research, the World Medical
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki calls for “informed consent, preferably
in writing” from physicians.37 Again, on biomedicine research, the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine calls for “free and informed”
consent.38 The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects insists that investigators must obtain the
“voluntary informed consent of the prospective subject. . . . Waiver of
informed consent is to be regarded as uncommon and exceptional, and must
in all cases be approved by an ethical review committee.”39 On research
involving human subjects in general, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
specifies that informed consent from participants in research must involve
discussion of the nature of the involved procedure, its risks and benefits, and
alternative treatments available.40 Finally, participants must also give free
assent.41
Regardless of whether it is free, explicit, informed, and voluntary, the
four essential elements of valid consent are comprehension or understanding,

35 Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 9, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 38 [hereinafter GDPR], http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN. In addition to article
9, article 7 requires that the request for data subjects’ consent must be clearly distinguishable, intelligible,
easily accessible, and expressed in clear and plain language. See id. at art. 7. The GDPR came into force
on May 25, 2018. See id. at art. 99.
36 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1949) (stating that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential . . . [and includes] legal capacity . . . free power of choice . . . sufficient knowledge
and comprehension of the [nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment] . . . to make an understanding
and enlightened decision.”).
37 WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects, World Med. Ass’n (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-ofhelsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/. The declaration was
promulgated in 1964 and revised nine times since. Id.
38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine art. 5, opened
for signature Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No. 164 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1999).
39 COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 22 (2002).
40 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2017).
41 Id.
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voluntary participation, competence, and disclosure.42 While the first three
refer to the duty of doctors or researchers to obtain the voluntary agreement
of human subjects before participation, the last one refers to their duty to
disclose adequate information to the subjects.43 Both limbs are integrated
requirements of consent as a single legal and moral doctrine.44 Seemingly,
the above frameworks in international and national law, codes, and
guidelines have provided the necessary and sufficient legal basis for
informed consent and for the use of one’s data or bio-specimens. But how
detailed descriptions of the research should be and how much disclosure
would be required as adequate remains controversial.
In the context of citizen science in health and medical research,
participants must face the additional uncertainty and unpredictability of
research progress. For example, in the 1980s, a group of Canavan diseaseaffected families developed a disease registry and tissue bank to encourage
research in the area.45 They provided tissue for research on the disease and
aided in the identification of other affected families.46 With three nonprofit
organizations, they developed a confidential database and Canavan disease
registry, attracting financial sponsorship.47 However, when one of the chosen
physician-researchers decided to isolate and patent the Canavan gene
sequence and develop genetic screening tests for it, the families sued the
researcher and his institution.48 The bitter legal battle ended only in halfvictory. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims, including lack of informed
consent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment of the patent, and
misappropriation of trade secrets.49 Nevertheless, the court upheld the claim
of unjust enrichment made by the tissue donors on the grounds that “the facts

42

Gopal Sreenivasan, Does Informed Consent to Research Require Comprehension?, 362 LANCET
2016, 2016 (2003).
43 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
44 Id.
45 About Canavan Disease, CANAVAN FOUNDATION, http://www.canavanfoundation.org/
about_canavan_disease (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). Canavan disease is a progressive, fatal neurological
disorder that begins in infancy. Id. It is caused by an inherited genetic abnormality resulting in improper
transmission of nerve signals. Id.; see Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health
Data Commons and the Transformation of Citizen Science, 4 Am. J.L. & Med. 651, 652 (2016)
(discussing the dispute).
46 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla.
2003).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1067–68.
49 Id. at 1077.
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paint a picture of a continued research collaboration that involved Plaintiffs
also investing time and significant resources.”50
In more recent times, another notorious example is the 23andMe
project. It became known in late 2007 as a company offering genetic testing
at a very low price of $299, giving out saliva collection kits and asking for
saliva samples.51 The testing was perceived as a “fun way” to learn about
one’s genetics.52 In 2008, 23andMe added a new research feature named
23andWe which played up citizen science rhetoric and community-driven
research, emphasizing strong participatory features.53 It invited customers
and participants to vote on of a list of diseases which the company promised
it would then prioritize in its research.54 In exchange, the customers and
participants were asked to disclose details about their lifestyles and other
relevant information for research purposes.55 By that time, the company had
offered free saliva collection kits to people who had been diagnosed with the
types of diseases that the company wanted to focus on and research.56
Additionally, the company lowered the price of saliva collection kit to $99.57
By 2012, 23andMe had about 150,000 users.58 The business was operating
as a commercial company drawing heavily on the contributions of citizen
science participants .
Some patients and members of patient support groups joined 23andMe
under the impression that they were contributing their genetic and personal
data for the development of treatment and long-term research.59 However,
they soon woke up to reality when the company filed a number of patent
applications in 2012.60 People realized that 23andMe was sharing aggregate
data about its customers and participants with third parties, and that Google

50

Id. at 1072–73.
Charles Seife, 23andMe Is Terrifying, but Not for the Reasons the FDA Thinks, SCI. AM. (Nov.
27, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/23andme-is-terrifying-but-not-for-the-reasonsthe-fda-thinks/ [https://perma.cc/W6KT-W26P].
52 Id.
53 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156; see also Dan Vorhaus, Genomic Research Goes DTC, ROBINSON
BRADSHAW HINSON GENOMICS L. REP. (July 9, 2009), https://www.genomicslawreport.com/
index.php/2009/07/09/genomic-research-goes-dtc/ [https://perma.cc/22F5-4SYD].
54 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Seife, supra note 51.
58 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156.
59 Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics
Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 154 (2017).
60 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156.
51
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had invested in the company.61 Consequently, 23andMe was severely
criticized, but defended itself by arguing it had informed the customers and
participants all along in its Terms of Service and consent forms.62 Although
23andMe’s actions were technically lawful, Barbara Prainsack pointed out
that it was dishonest and immoral for the company to capitalize on the “free
labour” and data capital of its customers, patients, and participants for profit
under the grand name of research.63 In particular, Prainsack observed that
23andMe’s business model was “continually evolving.”64 It was highly
unlikely that participants could keep up with the frequent modifications to
the Terms of Service and the fast-changing, constantly-updated terms in
small print on the website.65
These two incidents illustrate that there is a misalignment of
orientations between citizen science participants and expert researchers. The
former group was motivated by a genuine commitment to facilitate disease
research, to contribute to health knowledge, and to create collective benefits.
In contrast, the latter was motivated by profit and individual or corporate
success. Yet, this mismatch might not be present at the research project’s
outset. Rather, it is due to the fluid and flexible nature of health and medical
research and citizen science that the projects soon spin out of control of
citizen science participants and evolve beyond their own meanings.
Additionally, expert researchers’ motivations can gradually grow apart
from the motivations of their research subjects. The relation between expert
researchers and participants is not on a traditional one-to-one model. Instead,
it rests on an elaborate network backed by complex organizational structures
and staffed by different experts at various levels. Citizen scientists or
participants, motivated by altruism to share their personal data, can
mistakenly think they can retain some form of control in a collaborative or
cooperative manner.66 Their solidarity, sadly, is later exploited by researchers
or commercial groups in both public and private spheres.
Furthermore, if informed consent requires disclosure by researchers and
comprehension by participants, then full disclosure of information will
become neither definable nor achievable at the outset of the research due to
the fast-changing nature of research. Writing on clinical treatment and
research, Onora O’Neill has remarked on the inherent deficiency of informed

61 In fact, the founder of the company, Anne Wojcicki, was the wife of Google boss Sergey Brin at
that time. Id. at 158; Seife, supra note 51.
62 Prainsack, supra note 12, at 156.
63 Id. at 156–57.
64 Id. at 157.
65 Id. at 156–57.
66 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 52.
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consent as a doctrine.67 She explains that this is not due to any procedural
deficiencies ensuring that informed consent has been fulfilled, but rather that
consent is a “propositional attitude.”68 It is a “description of a proposal” for
treatment or research.69 One can only consent to the specific descriptions of
a proposition but may not be aware of the foreseeable consequences.
Does O’Neill’s conclusion mean that informed consent is no longer
valid? Alternatively, does it suggest that it is high time for an urgent
refinement of the requirement of consent? Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano
Floridi have argued that the traditional framework on informed consent
“does not cleanly transfer” to research involving biomedical big data.70 They
point out this is because the doctrine of informed consent is formulated for
single, specific research or treatment but not for the sharing, aggregating, or
repurposing of data that may reveal unforeseen information.71 As a result,
until we have found a satisfactory alternative model, the pressing concerns
on obtaining informed consent for citizen science research in health data
remain: deciding why the data are collected and how long the data will be
kept, identifying who is permitted to have access to the data and who is
processing the data for what purposes, and determining what to do in case
the data are misused.72
IV. RENEGOTIATING CONSENT
To tackle the above, researchers in this area have formulated different
models of informed consent. Here, we evaluate the common forms of open,
broad, dynamic, portable, and meta consent.
A. Open Consent
In light of the inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of big data
health research, some scholars have advocated for veracity or “radical
honesty”73 in the model of “open consent,” which deliberately excludes any
promises about privacy and requires participants to demonstrate
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ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 42–43 (2002).
Id. at 43.
69 Id.
70 Brent D. Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Big Data: Current and Foreseeable Issues
in Biomedical Contexts, 22 SCI. ENG. ETHICS 303, 311 (2016).
71 Id. at 312.
72 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 51–54.
73 JOHN T. WILBANKS, Portable Approaches to Informed Consent and Open Data, in PRIVACY, BIG
DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 234, 234–35 (Julia Lane et al. eds.,
2014).
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comprehension of the nature of the research and the risks involved prior to
enrollment.74
Open consent has been used in the famous Personal Genome Project
(PGP) by Harvard University since 2005.75 The aim of the project is to test
DNA sequencing technologies on human subjects by building a database of
human genomes and traits, with the ambition to be a global network project.76
The nature of the database is open source, open access, participatory, and
collaborative. The target is to collect the genomes of 100,000 individuals and
to make the information public with no serious effort at de-identification.77
Since DNA is the ultimate digital identifier of an individual but deidentification of samples would impoverish the data,78 the PGP research team
has decided to be forthright and honest with the participants, aiming for them
to be “truly informed” about the nature of the research.79 Participation of the
public is encouraged and volunteers are asked to give open consent to ensure
that they understand the scientific nature of the experiment and that they also
understand that privacy and confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.80
Misha Angrist, one of the original ten participants of the PGP back in
2006, shared his experience and reflections.81 According to him, participants
had to first go through an eligibility screening process which included filling
out a questionnaire regarding family circumstances and privacy
preferences.82 Second, they would review a study guide that covered the
potential risks of participating.83 Third, they then took an “entrance exam”
that covered the areas of how PGP worked, knowledge of genetics, ethical
principles governing human subjects research, and their comfort level with
having their genome and health records in the public domain.84 They had to
score 100% on the exam before they could be enrolled in the project.85
Finally, they had to sign a consent form, which stated the possibility of re74 Madeleine P. Ball et al., Harvard Personal Genome Project: Lessons from Participatory Public
Research, 6 GENOME MED. 10 (2014). Other examples of open consent model include the Omics project,
The Human Microbiome Project, and the American Gut Project. See Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra
note 5, at 14–16.
75 THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/ (last visited May 9, 2018).
76 At the time of writing, UK, Canada, and Austria have joined the network. Id.
77 Misha Angrist, Eyes Wide Open: The Personal Genome Project, Citizen Science and Veracity in
Informed Consent, 6 PERSONALIZED MED. 691, 694 (2009).
78 Id. at 693.
79 Id. at 693–94.
80 Id. at 694–95.
81 Id. at 695.
82 Id. at 694.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 695.
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identification, disclosure of non-paternity, and loss of insurance, as well as
other risks of embarrassment, discrimination, data loss, or any unforeseen
problems.86
Participants were described as “co-drivers” of the project.87 They were
expected to have solid knowledge about the field. Take Angrist as an
example; he himself is a scientist who worked for an established institute for
genome science and policy.88 He completed an early version of the entrance
exam and suggested changes to certain questions, and questioned the
rationale for specific analyses.89 He was also one of the three initial ten
participants who served on the PGP Board of Directors.90 He was careful
enough to carry out a certain test on his genotype and make sure the result
was negative before deciding to make his cell line available to the public.91
However, it is doubtful how many other citizen scientists or participants
could achieve such thorough understanding of the research and its
implications to privacy.
B. Broad Consent
Rather than asking participants to take a leap of faith into uncertainty,
a slightly refined model of broad consent has been proposed. While one gives
consent to a framework for future research of certain types, ethical review of
each specific research project by an independent ethics committee is
required.92 In addition, researchers must provide strategies on how to
regularly update the participants and how to enable ongoing withdrawal
opportunities for the participants.93 Examples of broad consent model
research are the UK Biobank project and the Norwegian Mother Child
Cohort Study.94 Nevertheless, regular updates to participants in ongoing
research are seen as “extras” in this model.95 Thus, legal and ethical concerns
have been raised as to whether broad consent is a form of genuine informed
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Id.
Id. at 693.
88 Id. at 691; see also FACULTY: MISHA ANGRIST, https://sanford.duke.edu/people/faculty/angristmisha (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
89 Angrist, supra note 77, at 693.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 695–96.
92 Kristin Solum Steinsbekk et al., Broad Consent Versus Dynamic Consent in Biobank Research: Is
Passive Participation an Ethical Problem?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 897, 897–900 (2013).
93 Id. at 897.
94 Jane Kaye et al., Dynamic Consent: A Patient Interface for Twenty-first Century Research
Networks, 23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 142, 142 (2015).
95 Id.
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consent when participants are reduced to passive subjects rather than
research partners.96
C. Dynamic Consent
The alternative model of dynamic consent approaches consent from a
unique perspective. It is a model tailor-made to the need of participants by
utilizing an online interface and information technology-based platform.
Information about the specific use of personal data and tissue as well as
requests for consent for such use are put to the participants through the online
platform.97 Participants are allowed to engage in an interactive personalized
interface as much or as little as they choose and to alter their consent choices
in real time.98 Consent is seen as a process, an ongoing interaction between
researchers and participants. Hence, consent becomes dynamic because it
allows participants to interact with the researchers over time, to consent to
new projects, and to alter their consent choices in light of any new
circumstances. This model was first designed for the EnCoRe project of three
biobanks in Oxford from 2008 to 2012.99 Another example is the Registries
for All (Reg4All) project run by Genetic Alliance in partnership with the
technology company Private Access.100 Reg4All allows participants to
decide how their data are being used and shared with particular researchers,
institutions, or people studying a specific disease.101 Participants can track
who has used their data and how.102
Scholars praise the model of dynamic consent as providing a
“personalised communication interface for interacting with patients,
participants and citizens,”103 implementing engagement 2.0 in the era of Web
2.0.104 Apparently, it enables consent to be given to multiple researchers and

96 Harriet JA Teare et al., Towards ‘Engagement 2.0’: Insights from a Study of Dynamic Consent
with Biobank Participants, DIG. HEALTH 1, 2 (2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/2055207615605644.
97 Kaye et al., supra note 94, at 145.
98 Id. at 142.
99 Id. at 145; Marco C. Mont et al., EnCoRe: Dynamic Consent, Policy Enforcement and Accountable
Information Sharing Within and Across Organisations, HEWLETT-PACKARD DEV. COMPANY, L.P. 1, 1–
4 (2012), http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2012/HPL-2012-36.pdf.
100 Debra J. H. Mathews & Leila Jamal, Revisiting Respect for Persons in Genomic Research, 5
GENES 1, 7–8 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3978508/pdf/genes-0500001.pdf; Courtney Humphries, New Disease Registry Gives Patients Some Privacy, MIT TECH. REV.
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/512456/new-disease-registry-gives-patientssome-privacy.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Kaye et al., supra note 94, at 141.
104 Teare et al., supra note 96, at 1.

28

16:15 (2018)

Moving Beyond Consent

projects, to open-ended and ongoing research, and to the use of secondary
research or downstreaming of data use. Besides, dynamic consent overcomes
the problem of locked-in consent confined to one experimental procedure for
granting autonomy, choice, and control to individuals. At the same time,
researchers can also manage the necessity to re-contact and to seek reconsent from participants much more easily.
Understandably, dynamic consent as a participant-centric initiative has
its special appeal. Refining the model of dynamic consent, there are further
variations on it.
D. Portable Legal Consent (PLC)
Another model is “portable legal consent” proposed by John Wilbanks
of Sage Bionetworks.105 This model recognizes that individuals have rights
with respect to the data generated from their bodies.106 They therefore will
decide the kind of data that they would like to donate and share. For example,
in the Sage Bionetworks, the suggested five categories of data are genetic
sequence, clinical information, medical record, patient reported outcomes,
and personal sensor data.107 Consent is not tied to any particular study but
carried around by the participants like organ donation status.108 In that sense,
consent becomes portable and controllable. Obtaining consent is done
through an online interactive consent system.109 Participants can share their
own data broadly in the public domain to serve scientific research regardless
of the particular institution involved.110 In turn, the database of genomic
information being collected through portable legal consent will be available
to anyone who agrees to its terms.111 These include a guarantee not to use the
data to harm anyone or to identify the participants.112 Users also agree to
publish their work based on an open-access policy.113
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WILBANKS, supra note 73, at 245.
Id.
107 Id. at 249.
108 Kuehn, supra note 8, at 679.
109 WILBANKS, supra note 73, at 246.
110 Id. at 245.
111 Synapse Terms and Conditions of Use: Summary of Key Provisions, SAGE BIONETWORKS (Oct.
26,
2015),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.synapse.org/governance/SageBionetworksSynapse
TermsandConditionsofUse.pdf?v=4. Synapse operates data governance for Sage Bionetworks. SYNAPSE,
https://www.synapse.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
112 Id.
113 Id.
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E. Meta Consent
Rather than focusing on the distinct categories of personal data, the
meta consent model allows participants to express a preference for how and
when to provide consent at a meta level, i.e. how and when they would like
to be presented with a request for consent to the use of their personal health
data and biological material.114 In this model proposed by Ploug and Holm,
participants must be provided with a predefined set of types of consent,115
data,116 and research contexts to choose from.117
While acknowledging similarities with dynamic consent, Ploug and
Holm argue that meta consent is different in that dynamic consent was
originally designed for biobanks.118 In contrast, meta consent is developed
with the aim to handle and configure consent preferences for the entire
population for all kinds of data and biological samples, with a vision that
every citizen is a potential participant in big data research—especially in
medical research.119 The meta consent model is designed “to provide a
definitive answer by letting individuals design future consent requests on the
basis of predefined types of consent, data, and contexts.”120
V. LIMITATIONS OF CONSENT
Regardless of which variation or refinement of consent one chooses,
problems remain. Other than the fact that the nature of research and open
consent require an advanced level of comprehension from citizen science
participants, open consent is far from true consent. First, open consent does
not allow participants to act meaningfully on their continuing interest in their
own health data. It does not include recontact of subjects, the subject’s right
to withdrawal, and the setting of time limits on the use of data.121 Further, it
does not have restrictions on how information or materials are going to be
114 Thomas Ploug & Søren Holm, Meta Consent – A Flexible Solution to the Problem of Secondary
Use of Health Data, 30 BIOETHICS 721, 724 (2016).
115 Id. at 725–26. Ploug and Holm mention three types of consent. The first is specific consent
referring to consent request for each new specific project using data, but not for each and every use of
data. Id. at 725. The second is broad consent for “broader categories of research.” Id. The third type is
blanket consent and blanket refusal for one-off decisions concerning participation or non-participation in
research. Id. at 725–26.
116 Id. at 726. This includes data from electronic patient records, “[t]issue/[g]enomic data,” health
databases, and linkage to non-health data. Id.
117 Id. Research context refers to private versus public, commercial versus non-commercial, and
national versus international. Id.
118 Id. at 732 n.29.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Timothy Caulfield et al., DNA Databanks and Consent: A Suggested Policy Option Involving an
Authorization Model, 4 BMC MED. ETHICS 1, 3 (2003).

30

16:15 (2018)

Moving Beyond Consent

shared to third parties, which is a potential cause for concern especially if
information is used later for commercial purpose.122 Besides, the way that it
operates does not take prevention of harm, such as discrimination and other
problems, into account. Altogether, so-called veracity has become an excuse
to absolve researchers from accountability and responsibility. Although open
consent may be legally valid, its practice remains ethically vague and
questionable.
In a similar vein, the alternative forms of consent are in essence
information governance models, which are useful only for well-informed,
engaged, and e-health literate participants.123 Concerns of digital divide and
social exclusion have yet to be addressed in the dynamic consent model.124
Participants will be asked for consent continuously because each new project
requires fresh consent to be given. Arguably a person may potentially receive
hundreds of consent requests each year.125 This is likely to cause routinization
of consent behavior, resulting in people not reading the information and not
reflecting on the choice, but simply choosing habitually to consent or refuse
to consent.126 Although the refined model of meta consent allows opt-out or
broad consent for future use of data, there is skepticism over whether meta
consent is considered a form of valid informed consent under the new
European Union regime of GDPR, which requires “explicit consent” for each
and every data processing.127 The common thread that runs through the
various models is that control has seemingly been passed to individual
participants. Yet at the same time, responsibility has also shifted to them
without ensuring that they have the required knowledge and competence to

122 See Henry T. Greely, Informed Consent and Other Ethical Issues in Human Population Genetics,
35 ANNU. REV. OF GENETICS 785 (2001).
123 See WILBANKS, supra note 73.
124 Steinsbekk et al., supra note 92, at 898–99.
125 Ploug & Holm, supra note 114, at 723. Ploug and Holm discuss the hypothetical experience of a
resident of Denmark if specific consent is required for every secondary use of data. Id.
126
Id. at 723–24.
127 See supra Part III. Article 4 of the GDPR has strengthened the requirements for consent to be
freely given, specific, informed, unambiguous, clear, and affirmative. Gauthier Chassang, The Impact of
the EU General Data Protection Regulation on Scientific Research, 11 ECANCERMEDICALSCIENCE (Jan.
3, 2017), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5243137/. Recital 33 allows a certain degree of
flexibility for scientific research. Id. Data subjects are allowed to “give their consent to certain areas of
scientific research when in keeping with recognised ethical standards for scientific research. Data subjects
should have the opportunity to give their consent only to certain areas of research or parts of research
projects to the extent allowed by the intended purpose.” Id. Hence, scientific research projects can only
include personal data on the basis of consent if the purpose is clearly defined and well-described. Where
purposes are unclear at the start of a scientific research program, stricter control and scrutiny may apply.
Chassang points out that personal data impact assessment or compatibility tests should be carried out for
data use in the context of research. Id.
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make informed decisions.128 Steinsbekk et al. have even argued that based on
the above point, broad consent may be better than dynamic consent, as at
least independent review from a research ethics committee is required.129
Overall, the above consent models may have enabled better
participation of participants, but they remain largely information strategies.
The mere passing of more information to participants, and the seeking of
their indication at different stages of research, does not necessarily amount
to building a democratic and participatory model of health and medical
research. Steinsbekk et al. point out that the participation envisaged is limited
as it is “participation inside an already established research arena where only
minor changes of policy are up for discussion.”130 Furthermore, at best, we
have filled only part of the knowledge gap (mentioned at the end of Part III
of this article) in enabling participants to find out more about the purposes
of data collection, the persons who have been accessing their data, and
empowering those participants to have more control on how their data are
being used down the stream of data reuse. The success of the remaining
alternative models is highly dependent on how informed, competent,
knowledgeable, and reflective the participants are. However, we have not
addressed the nightmare scenario of what to do in case things go wrong.
VI. BEYOND CONSENT: THE MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Indisputably, consent plays an important role in health and medical
research, but mere information disclosure and seeking participants’
indication of choices do not necessarily guarantee the respect and selfdetermination of individuals. At most, the above-suggested alternative
consent frameworks have fulfilled the contractual ritual required by law.131
They may have “managed” the legal concerns,132 but they have not resolved
the problems of risks and harms not mentioned in the terms of agreement.
Rather than shifting across different modes of consent and putting
participants through a strenuous exercise of choices and forms, a consent
model should be complemented with an accountability model.
Big data technology has opened up undreamed-of capacities to gain a
sophisticated understanding about the way we can process and use data to
organize our society and our lives. Those insights, unfortunately, can be
pitfalls at the same time. Governments in different jurisdictions are eager to
128

Steinsbekk et al., supra note 92, at 900.
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131 Ulrike Felt et al., Refusing the Information Paradigm: Informed Consent, Medical Research, and
Patient Participation, 13(1) HEALTH 87, 101 (2009).
132 Id. at 102.
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capture the benefits of big data but also to weed out its harms.133 In the present
discussion, the medical sectors have used big data to monitor disease and
assist in clinical decision-making. Yet the potential harms of big data
technology should not be overlooked, especially when individuals’ personal
lives are being affected significantly. When big data is used to define and
construct identity—as in defining who a healthy citizen or employee is—
issues of privacy and personal data protection, discrimination and exclusion,
as well as procedural fairness are inevitably involved.134 One common fear
related to identification from health and medical data is insurance
discrimination based on disease susceptibility.135 Another fear is group-level
harm from analysis of aggregated data, including the risks of
stigmatization.136 This is considered to be more problematic as all members
of the community will be affected, not only those who have given consent
for their data to be used.
The risk and harm of stigmatization cannot be underestimated. For
instance, it has been reported that a “warrior gene” is found to be prevalent
in New Zealand Maori, which some scientists have suggested might explain
why violence is common in the Maori community.137 This conclusion carries
a potentially stigmatic effect beyond genetic research when one considers
that police officers and jurors may be influenced by the finding.138 Similar
claims that a particular population has a high level of a genetic variation
associated with alcoholism, diabetes, or obesity could be stigmatic and lead
to victim blaming.139 Anonymized data subjects may be grouped according
to geographical, socio-economic, ethnic, or other characteristics.140
Indigenous groups have raised concerns about the risk that they will be
singled out for discrimination in big data health research.141 Furthermore,
there is the concern of cultural harm which poses threats to the group in an
unforeseen and unintended manner. For instance, data subjects give blood to
researchers believing it is for diagnosis without realizing that researchers are

133 See Bart van der Sloot & Sascha van Schendel, Ten Questions for Future Regulation of Big Data:
A Comparative and Empirical Legal Study, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. 110, 116–17
(2016), http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-7-2-2016/4438.
134 See SERGE GUTWIRTH & MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, Some Caveats on Profiling, in DATA
PROTECTION IN A PROFILED WORLD 31, 35–36 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2010).
135 Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 70, at 316.
136 Greely, supra note 122, at 789–791.
137 Jason Grant Allen, Group Consent and the Nature of Group Belonging: Genomics, Race and
Indigenous Rights, 20(2) J.L. INF. & SCI. 28, 32 (2009).
138 Id.
139 Id.; Greely, supra note 122, at 790.
140 Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra note 70, at 318.
141 Greely, supra note 122, at 794–95.
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taking their human DNA and patenting its products.142 Yet, the practice of
patenting a human gene sequence is deeply offensive and considered to be
fundamentally immoral to certain native tribes.143 The above reveals some
controversial legal and ethical issues of informed consent, group level harm,
and the control of research uses and materials.
Scholars have advocated for the incorporation of risk and harm
assessment to tackle the problems of re-identification and discrimination in
data privacy protection.144 Although they are writing in the larger context of
cloud computing and big data technology, their proposed models on datadriven accountability are equally applicable in our context of big data health
research.145
A. Risk Assessment of the Disclosure and Reuse of Data
To ensure accountability, regulation of disclosure, and reuse of personal
data, it is necessary to include de-identified data146 because third parties may
identify the individuals concerned through data combination. This may lead
to profiling, and the risks and adverse effects of profiling through data
mining and data combination are well-recognized.147 Data brokers have been
collecting, analyzing, selling, and linking individual identities without our
knowledge for some time.148 For example, Acxiom, the largest data broker in

142 Pauline
Lane,
Blood
Money,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Jan.
21,
1998,
http://www.theguardian.com/science/1998/jan/21/genetics.
143 Allen, supra note 137, at 35. Other types of cultural harm include research findings that contradict
the traditional beliefs and knowledge system of the group studied, leading to the loss of political or legal
claims to certain territories or upsetting a group cohesion or social identity when certain members are
discovered to be “genetic outsiders.” Id. at 33–35.
144 See supra Part IV § A.
145 See Anne S.Y. Cheung, Re-personalizing Personal Data in the Cloud, in PRIVACY AND LEGAL
ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING 69 (Anne S.Y. Cheung & Rolf H. Weber eds., 2015) (including parts of
the discussion remaining in this paper).
146 Id. at 78–79. De-identified data includes anonymized and pseudonymous data. The former refers
to “personal data that has been collected, altered or otherwise processed in such a way that it can no longer
be attributed to a data subject.” Id. at 78. The later refers to “explicit identifiers being replaced with
codes.” Id. at 79.
147 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING
THE ISSUES 8–12 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-orexclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf; see also Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, Opinion
7/2015 Meeting the Challenges of Big Data: A Call for Transparency, User Control, Data Protection by
Design and Accountability 7–9 (2015), https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/
mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15-11-19_Big_Data_EN.pdf.
148 The FTC uses the term “data broker” to refer to those that “collect and aggregate consumers’
personal information from a wide range of sources and resell it for an array of purposes, such as
marketing, verifying an individual’s identity, and preventing financial fraud.” FED. TRADE COMM’N,
WHAT INFORMATION DO DATA BROKERS HAVE ON CONSUMERS, AND HOW DO THEY USE IT 2 (2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-
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the U.S. and a marketing giant, holds an average of 1,500 pieces of
information on each of more than 200 million Americans.149 Also, it is
estimated that each piece of information that users post on Facebook is worth
five cents and that each Facebook user is worth $100 as a source of
information.150 Presently, there is limited regulation of the secondary use of
data in most jurisdictions, particularly when they take the ostensible form of
de-identified, nonpersonal data.151 Ultimately, this is an issue of data security,
relating to the obligations of data controllers to protect against unauthorized
data access, use, and disclosure by third parties.
I am not advocating for a complete ban on the use of de-identified data.
Indeed, there are legitimate reasons to reuse de-identified (pseudonymous)
data,152 such as in pharmaceutical trials and medical data research or for other
legitimate purposes that serve the public interest. In such cases, scholars have
recommended that clear guidelines be set, with minimum standards
established for the de-identification of datasets and independent reviews of
the risk of re-identification before data disclosure.153 Many have advocated
that a specific model be used to measure the continuum of risk involved. For
example, Hon et al. use the “realistic risk of identification” as a benchmark,154
whereas Schwartz and Solove suggest the “substantial risk of
identification.”155 More concretely, Ohm recommends that any risk
commission-entitled-what-information-do-data-brokers-haveconsumers/131218databrokerstestimony.pdf.
149
Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, (CBS News Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/data-brokers-selling-personal-information-60-minutes/.
150 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 119 (2013).
151 The new regime under the EU will regulate pseudonymised data under article 4 section 5 of the
GDPR. GDPR, supra note 35, at art. 4. Both the US and Australia do not regulate de-identified data as
the data are not subject to privacy laws. How Can Covered Entities Use and Disclose Protected Health
Information for Research and Comply with the Privacy Rule?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES
NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_08.asp (last visited May 18,
2018); De-identification and the Privacy Act, AUSTL. GOV’T: OFFICE OF THE AUSTL. INFO. COMM’R,
https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/agencies-and-organisations/guides/de-identification-and-theprivacy-act.pdf (last visited May 24, 2018). See generally International Review: Secondary Use of Health
and Social Care Data and Applicable Legislation, DELOITTE (Sept. 5, 2016),
https://media.sitra.fi/2017/02/28142605/International_review_secondary_use_health_data.pdf.
152 Article 4 section 5 of the GDPR defines “pseudonymisation” to be “the processing of personal
data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without
the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an
identified or identifiable natural person.” GDPR, supra note 35, at art. 4.
153 W. Kuan Hon et al., The Problem of ‘Personal Data’ in Cloud Computing: What Information Is
Regulated?—The Cloud of Unknowing, 1 INT’L. DATA PRIVACY L. 211, 215 (2011).
154 Id. at 226.
155 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1882 (2011).
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assessment should take account of (1) the data-handling techniques used by
database owners, (2) the nature of information release, with the public
disclosure of data being subject to stricter scrutiny, (3) the quantity of data
involved, (4) the likely motives and economic incentives for anyone to reidentify the data, and (5) the trust culture in a particular industry or sector—
that is, the existing standard of fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality in
that sector.156 Furthermore, as data identification and combination
technologies are advancing at a rapid pace, I contend that any risk assessment
concerned should be carried out on a regular basis with citizen scientists,
rather than only at the stages of data collection and de-identification and
disclosure.
B. Re-identification: Data Quality and Size
When considering threats of re-identification external to the original
research team or organizations, data quality and size also need to be taken
into account. Data quality refers to the nature, sensitivity, and linkability of
data to individuals.157 Linkability refers to the different degrees of data
identifiability or the levels of effort required to identify an individual.158 An
example of good quality data is the information presented in Google Flu
Trends. Regardless of whether its predictions are accurate,159 the information
that Google gathers from the online web search queries submitted by
millions of individuals is abstracted at a high level and safely aggregated.160
Another important element of data quality is data size. The size of a
database is determinative of how easy it is to link the information therein to
an individual. The larger the database, the easier that link is to make.161
However, the law seems to be silent regarding data controllers and how much
data they may collect, how long they may retain data, and whether stricter
security measures are needed for large databases.162 Ohm argues that new
quantitative limits and guidelines should be enacted to address these
156 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1765–68 (2010).
157 Id. at 1766.
158 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Technique,
WP216, at 11 (Apr. 10, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf (“Linkability, which is the ability to link, at least, two records
concerning the same data subject or a group of data subjects (either in the same database or in two
different databases).”).
159 Charles Arthur, Google Flu Trends Is No Longer Good at Predicting Flu, Scientists Find, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/27/googleflu-trends-predicting-flu.
160 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 155, at 1882.
161 Ohm, supra note 156, at 1766–67.
162 Id.
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issues.163 Such limits and guidelines would undoubtedly have an impact on
bio-banks given the vast quantity of data stored in them, but they are still
certainly deserving of further consideration.
In sum, in determining the likelihood of re-identification, we must also
consider the quality and quantity of the data in question. Ultimately, the core
issue in personal data protection is identity protection.
C. Sensitive Data and Recombination of Data
Many of the foregoing measures are dependent on the compliance
framework of the data controllers and the organizations or companies
concerned. Participants often have no idea that their data are being reused
and processed or that they have been re-identified. It is therefore important
to formulate an alternative privacy framework that is based less on consent
and more on holding data controllers accountable for the particular reuse of
data based on risk and the likely adverse impact on data subjects when the
unauthorized disclosure takes place. Namely, the European Union has a
higher standard for the use of sensitive personal data, which includes genetic,
biometric, and health data under the new GDPR, while the U.S. regulates the
combination of data.
The EU affords sensitive personal data special protection. Article 9 of
the GDPR requires explicit consent from data subjects before any processing
of sensitive data.164 In addition, recital 51 of the GDPR specifies that personal
data “which are, by their nature, particularly sensitive in relation to
fundamental rights and freedoms merit specific protection as the context of
their processing could create significant risks to the fundamental rights and
freedoms.”165 Examples of such include personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin. Although the categories of sensitive data are likely to be
controversial in different contexts and cultures, the “sensitive” nature of
certain data reveals the underlying values and harm concerned. For example,
data related to an individual’s health (particularly sensitive health
information such as HIV status) may lead to discrimination against that
individual.166 Bearing in mind the threat of harm arising from the re163

Id. at 1767.
Article 9 of the EU GDPR prohibits the processing of personal data revealing “racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade-union membership, and the
processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purposes of uniquely identifying a natural person, data
concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation,” unless data subjects
provide their explicit consent or other conditions under article 9(2) are satisfied. GDPR, supra note 35,
at art. 9.
165 GDPR, supra note 35.
166 It was recently reported that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been “collecting
racial and ethnic information and ‘mapping’ American communities around the country based on crude
164
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identification of certain data, here I would argue that organizations need to
ensure that sensitive data, which may perhaps be better described as critical
data, are stored separately from the general network. They also need to
ensure that access to such data is carefully monitored and that combination
with other data cannot easily take place. Public disclosure must be
impossible.167
Rather than imposing a high standard on a discrete category of sensitive
data, there is special restriction on the combination of data in the U.S. For
instance, in 2013, California amended its law on personal information to
include regulation of the practice of data combination by imposing new
requirements on the operators of commercial websites or online services that
collect the personal information of Californian consumers.168 The relevant
provisions were further amended in 2016.169 Under the amended section
1798.29 of the California Civil Code, the definition of personal information
has been expanded to include “[a]n individual’s first name or first initial and
last name in combination with any one or more” of five stated categories of
data fields (if any is unencrypted): (1) social security number, (2) driver’s
licence number or California identification card number, (3) bank account
number or credit or debit card number in combination with any required
“security code, access code, or password” that would permit access to an
individual’s financial records, (4) medical information, (5) health insurance
information, and (6) “information or data collected through the use or
operation of an automated license plate recognition system.”170 The
definition also now includes “a user name or email address, in combination
with a password or security question and answer that would permit access to
an online account.”171 All of this information is subject to a specific duty of
notice of breach and security requirement.172 California’s approach to
regulating the combination of certain categories of unencrypted information
constitutes a move in the right direction.
stereotypes about which groups commit different types of crimes.” Seeta Peña Gangadharan & Sean
Vitka, Knowing Is Half the Battle: Combating Big Data’s Dark Side Through Data Literacy, SLATE (Apr.
2, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/04/02/white_house_big_data_and_
privacy_review_we_need_federal_policy_about_digital.html [https://perma.cc/6BS6-65QN].
167 See Ohm, supra note 156, at 1768.
168 S. 46, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
169 Assemb. 2828, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
170 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(g)(1) (West 2017). An “[a]utomated license plate recognition system”
is defined under section 1798.90.5 of the California Civil Code to mean a “searchable computerized
database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer
algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computerreadable data.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.90.5 (West 2016).
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The emphasis is rightly on data being unattributable to a specific data
subject without the use of additional information, as long as such additional
information is kept separately and subject to technical and organizational
measures to ensure anonymity.173 In addition, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has recommended a more robust system of deidentification and accountability.174 Rather than toiling with various concepts
of de-identified data (anonymous, anonymized, and pseudonymous data), the
FTC acknowledges that the de-identification of data is not foolproof, and
thus there is always a possibility that individuals will be re-identified.175
Accordingly, it recommends that companies should adopt a three-prong
approach: (1) robustly de-identify personal data; (2) publicly make a
commitment not to re-identify data, and (3) contractually require the same
public commitment from any downstream users with which they share data
with.176 Such requirements should extend to the sharing of data with thirdparties owing to the possibility of subsequent attribution by later parties.177
VII.

CONCLUSION

Big data and information communication technologies hold great
promise for health and medical citizen science. Citizen scientists can connect
and exchange data with one another and with researchers. This has led to
growing expectations to access and reuse the data in bio-banks and
repositories. In grappling with the shifting nature of data and ever-evolving
technology, various notions of consent have been formulated to resolve the
tension between researchers’ need for data and subjects’ will for privacy and
self-determination. Yet all the attempts to refine and redefine consent have
proved to be futile conquests to preserve an individual’s full autonomy.
Embedded in big data analytics is the use of both data and personal data
and the matching of data sets. Arguably, one does not have enough data and
medical science literacy to give meaningful consent to research involving
such technology. To most participants, their consent may have reiterated
their dependency on expert researchers, medical professionals, or state
authorities. Regardless whether it is open or dynamic or a variation inbetween, consent only gives an illusion of control in the big data age. Despite
173 Recital 29 of the GDPR governs the measures on the use of pseudonymous data. GDPR, supra
note 35.
174 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 21–22 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-erarapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
175 Id. at 22.
176 Id. at 21–22, 37.
177 Id. at 21.
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the fact that the formulations of consent may be compatible with existing
legal standards, they may be a far cry from ethical imperatives such as
personal dignity, equality, and democratic accountability. The layered
meanings of consent often come with a broader shift of unsolicited
responsibility from public healthcare authorities, commercial actors, or
institutional researchers to individual participants.178 Regulators have warned
that the transfer of risk and regulation should not “signal a reduction in the
standards and quality of healthcare provision.”179 What lies behind the
seeming empowerment of citizens should not be a disguised exploitation or
extraction and sale of personal data leading to discrimination against
individuals or groups.
While consent is still essential in medical and health research, it must
be assured by a complementary system of data-driven accountability.
Consent alone is not enough to restore autonomy to individual and citizen
scientists in fast-evolving, data-intensive research. As there are different
dimensions and forms of citizen science, so should the participation of
citizen scientists at various stages of research follow the life cycle of data
usage including risk and harm assessment, re-identification, and
combination of data. The solution to attain autonomy must come through a
comprehensive set of citizen science practice involving data research.

178 Eline M. Bunnik et al., A Tiered-Layered-Staged Model for Informed Consent in Personal
Genome Testing, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 596, 598 (2013). The layered meanings of consent refer to
the different layers or levels of information that is required. Id. at 598. The first basic level is directed at
fundamental information essential for informed consent, which is explicitly offered to data subjects and
is often kept minimal to enable easy communication. Id. The second or further layers of consent is based
on extendable information, accessible for data subjects who actively seek for it or who have signed up
for ongoing research, re-contact, or extras in the models of dynamic consent, portable legal consent, or
meta consent. Id.
179 Opinion No. 29 of the EGE, supra note 5, at 62.

40

